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FTC Activityand PresidentialEffectsRevisted
An articleby Yandlein thisjournal1usesour earlieranalysisof FTC enas a springovertime(1938-1974)2
in theareaofdeceptive
forcement
practices
activity
thatourworkhasbeendeemedworthy
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research.
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ofcommentor citationbyYandleandbyothers.3
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forchairmenand presidents."7
Yandlesuggeststhathisfindingsshould
partyaffiliation
from
redirectthefociof researchers
away
partyin power and lifecycle-incrementalism
influence
and
toward "the special interesttheories,combined
models of regulatory
with congressionalinfluence."8
While, as Yandle notes,his "findingsdo not deny the relationshipreportedby
Stewartand Cromartie,"9the implicationsof the studiesare sufficiently
divergentto
command closer examination.We reexamineboth analysesto clarifythe meanings
of the findingsand to suggest paths for futureresearchon this topic.
Our Data, Yandle'sMethod
One sourceof theapparentlydivergentimplicationsmaylie in themethods
used. What resultsobtainif the deceptivepracticesdata used in our originalanalysis
are analyzedin the mannerused by Yandle? Table 1 presentsthe resultsand shows
thattheresultsaresimilarto Yandle'sTable4.10The averagelevelofdeceptivepractices
complaintsissuedis higherin yearswhen a Democrat occupiestheWhite House than
in GOP years,but the difference
is not significant.
Does thisanalysiscontradictour earlierwork? Our answeris "no." We did not
mean to implyin our earlierwork thattheabsolutelevelsof deceptivepracticesregulation arehigherduringDemocraticadministrations.
Such an implicationwould ignore
timingas an importantinfluenceon such activities,and we note that therehas been
a slightdecreasein officialdeceptivepracticescomplaintsissued over time.11Thus,
we plead both guiltyand innocentto the allegation that we assume "that actions
are homogeneousthroughtime."12Like Yandle,we assumethatan officialcomplaint
issued duringFranklinRoosevelt'spresidencyis equivalent,as a unit of analysis,to
a complaintissued duringLyndonJohnson'stenure.We simplyknow of no way to
proceedwith the analysisof this importantissue without making this assumption.
We do notassume that the levelofactivity
duringthe Wilson administration(or
any Democratic administration)should be more similarto that of the Johnsonadministrationfivedecades later (or any other Democratic administration)than it is
to the level of activityduringthe succeedingHarding administration(or any other
Republicanadministration).Only Yandle'sapproachrequiressuch an assumption;it
is examinedempiricallyin our analysis.We findclear similaritiesin the trends
in the
issuanceof officialdeceptivepracticescomplaintswithinpartisanadministrations
and
cleardifferences
in thetrends
betweenpartisanadministrations.
of
the
absoRegardless
lute levels,our originalconclusionholds. The trendsin the issuanceof officialdeceptivepracticescomplaintsby the FTC declineduringDemocratic administrations
and
TABLE 1

OfficialDeceptivePracticesComplaintsIssuedby theFTC by Partyin the
WhiteHouse, 1938-1974
Party

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Democratic
Republican

23
14

125.1
109.1

91.8
37.2

F - 0.38; significancelevel « .54.
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from1938-1974. The wave-likepatternwould
riseduringRepublicanadministrations
as a downswing would be follead us to anticipateYandle'sfindingof no difference,
a
Presidential
vice
after
lowed by an upswing (and
transition.Further
partisan
versa)
evidenceof the factthat the mean levelof complaintsmasks importantvariationsin
our findingthata model includingthe partisanPresidentialtransitionsincreasesour
abilityto explainvarianceby 53 percentagepointsovera simplemodel thatdoes not
include such transitions.13
Lookingat theForest,Missingthe Trees
conclusionsmay lie in the factthat
Anotherreasonforreachingdifferent
Yandle includes a wider range of phenomena over a broader span of time than do
we. While moreexpansiveanalysesare usuallyto be applauded,theycan also become
overlyinclusive,blurringthe natureof the object of analysis.
so why should we
Yandle notesthatthe FTC's activitiesare "widely varying,"14
combinediversephenomenaand expectsimilarpatternsofinfluence?The major addition Yandle makes is in the formof anti-trustcomplaints.Do we reallyexpect the
same politicalactorsto be concernedwith or to influencedeceptivepracticesregulation and anti-trustregulation?
While a directanswerto thisquestion is beyondthe scope of thisstudy,we can
offersome suggestive,secondaryevidence.Mahaneyand Tschoegl15analyzeFTC antitrustactivityfrom1917-1980 and argue that FTC complaintissuance in that area
is most stronglyaffectedby "the percentageof Democrats in the Senate,the rateof
Their findings
growthofrealGNP, and theearlyand recentyearsofFTC existence."16
in conjunctionwith our earlierwork on deceptivepracticessuggestthatPresidential
partisanshipis the major determinantof trendsin deceptivepracticesenforcement,
while Senate partisanshipis the major determinantof anti-trustactivity.If different
forces,whatevertheymightbe, are usefulin explainingthe separateactivitiesof the
FTC, we would not necessarilyexpect to be able to explain overallpatternsof the
FTC's behavioras well as we could explain the component parts.17
Certainlynone of the studiescitedhere,includingour own, are adequate to test
these hypotheses.18
But, the findingsare consistentwith an argumentthat by folto examinethe influenceson the FTC in general,we may miss
Yandle's
cell
lowing
theinfluenceson the specificparts.Justas "one should not considerregulatorypolicy
or regulatorycommissionsas one homogeneous type,"19it appearsthat even within
commissionsgeneralanalysesmay miss importantvariations.Put anotherway,ifwe
pose the question "Why do we have this forest?"we may not be able to answerthe
question"Why do we havethesespecifickindsof treesin the forest?"Both are obviously questionsworthyof study.But, we suspectthat the latteris more susceptible
to successfulresolution,which should guide researchon the former.
A BriefAnalysisof Yandle'sData, Our Method
Despite our seriousmisgivingsabout combiningall FTC complaintsfor
analysis,we go throughthe exerciseof subjectingYandle'sdata to a multipleinterWhile
ruptedtimeseries(MITS) analysis,themethodwe use in our originalanalysis.20
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thepatternsfoundby examiningYandle'sdependentvariablesdo not lead to the same
conclusionsas when we examineonlydeceptivepracticescomplaints,we arenot quite
as readyas Yandle to discardpresidentialeffectsas an explanationforregulatorypatterns.First,modelingpartisanPresidentialtransitionsenhancesour abilityto explain
levelsof "final actions" and "final actions" per employeeover simpler,incremental
models. Bivariateregressionof "finalactions" over time explainsonly 12 percentof
the varianceas opposed to 49 percentwith our MITS analysis;for "final actions"
per employee,the comparablefiguresare 8 percentand 42 percent.
Second, in each partisanPresidentialera, with the exceptionof the truncated
Nixon-Fordyears,significant
or in the trend.
changesoccur in eitherthe short-term
Yandle's
the
data
show
clear
differences
between
Using
dependentvariables,
partisan
Presidentialeras. The difference
between this conclusion and the conclusion of our
previouswork is thatthedirectionsofpartisanPresidentialeffectsarenot consistently
different
betweenparties.FTC activitiesrise duringthe Wilson Democratic era and
the EisenhowerRepublican years; the trendlines are negativeduring the HardingDemocraticyears.
Coolidge-HooverRepublicanyearsand duringtheKennedy-Johnson
Furthermore,the inaugurationof Democrat Roosevelt presagesa jump in FTC activity,and Kennedy'sswearingin marksa sharp decline in "final actions" per employee.In sum,in explainingoverallFTC activityfrom1916-1974,whethermeasured
in raw output ("finalactions") or in efficiency
("final actions" per employee)terms,
Presidential
effects
are
not
consistent,but Presidentialtransitionsdo make
partisan
a difference.
Yandlealso providesdata on thepartyaffiliations
of theChairpersonsof theFTC
and the majorityof Commissioners,but he does not analyze them extensively.He
does not directlyaddressthepossibilitiesthatthepartisanship
of theFTC Chairperson
or majoritymighthave independenteffectson the FTC's activities.To addressthese
possibilities,partisanshipof the FTC Chairpersonand of the FTC majorityare added
to the MITS equation, separatelyand together.21
For "finalactions,"the additionof
neithervariable,individuallynor together,enhancesthe analysis.For "finalactions"
per employee,the partisanshipof the Chairpersonby itselfhas a significantpositive
effect,but thisis mitigatedby the additionof the partisanshipof the FTC's majority
as a variable.In short,the partisanshipof the FTC's Chair and majoritydo not seem
to have a major impact independentof the partycontrollingthe White House.
Conclusions
We arehappythatYandlehas chosento takeup our call forfurther
research
on the politicsof the FTC. Given the combinationof his academicexpertiseand his
formerposition as ExecutiveDirector of the FTC, his thoughtsprovidea valuable
serviceto those of us who researchsuch importantinstitutionsfromafar(the "view
fromthe sticks"as one of Stewart'sformercolleagues has so aptlyput it). His work
offersfurtherinsightson thisimportantorganizationand has promptedus to think
moresystematically
aboutour own work.AlthoughYandleand we, as is all too common
in research,talk past each other tò a certainextent,thereare clear conclusionsthat
can be reachedby appropriatelycombining our findings.
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Yandle makes the importantpoint that we cannot merelyrelyon Presidential
partisanshipto predictthe absolute levels of activityof the FTC over time. To the
extentthat we implied that or that readersinferredthat fromour previouswork,
we apologize fornot being pellucid. Our point is that the trendsin FTC deceptive
different
betweenDemocratic
practices
complaintissuancethrough1974 areinterestingly
and Republican administrations.
withYandleon two points.First,we suspectthatfocusing
But, we appearto differ
on overallFTC activityas opposed to focusingon patternswithin its widely varied
areasof responsibility
may obscureas much as it revealsabout the politicaleconomy
of theFTC. The broaderfocusis consistentwith theefforts
ofboth politicalscientists
and economiststo develop"generaltheories"of regulation.But, as Yandledulynotes
each has its blinders.We would suggest
with his outline of fiveof these theories,22
that an inductiveapproachdrawingon the insightsof various theoriesand focused
on delineatingthe crucialpolitical and economic factorsin the various sub-areasof
maybe moreappropriate.This approach
regulation(e.g. deceptivepractices,anti-trust)
offersthe promiseof building empiricaltheorieswhich may sensitizeus to critical
in developingvalid
conditionalrelationshipswhich have thwartedour effectiveness
theories.
general
In addition, such researchshould consciouslyconsiderchange over time. It is
not clearwhy we should expectthe influencescrucialto the FTC in one era to necessarilybe the major variablesexplainingactivityat anothertime.
The second point with which we would disagreewith Yandle is on the appropriatefociof researchin seekingto explainvariationsin FTC activity.While he may
well be correctin suggestingthat"the specialinteresttheories,combinedwith conwill proveto be most valid,we are not yetreadyto eliminate
gressionalinfluence."23
fromconsiderationpartisanPresidentialinfluenceas a significantpredictor.Our reso we would urge more explicit
searchis not alone in findingPresidentialeffects,24
variablesin conjunctionwith otherpossible influences
testingof Presidency-related
beforetheyare ignored.
Finally,we join with Yandlein callingformoreresearchusing "richermodels."25
We concur with Moe that "simple popular models of regulationare likelyto give
ifnothighlydistorted
accountsofwhyagenciesbehaveas theydo."26
anemicexplanations,
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